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METONYMY BASED ON CULTURAL BACKGROUND 
KNOWLEDGE AND PRAGMATIC INFERENCING: 
EVIDENCE FROM SPOKEN DISCOURSE




Th e characterization of metonymy as a conceptual tool for guiding inferencing in language 
has opened a new ﬁ eld of study in cognitive linguistics and pragmatics. To appreciate the 
value of metonymy for pragmatic inferencing, metonymy should not be viewed as 
performing only its prototypical referential function. Metonymic mappings are operative 
in speech acts at the level of reference, predication, proposition and illocution. 
Th e aim of this paper is to study the role of metonymy in pragmatic inferencing in spoken 
discourse in televison interviews. Case analyses of authentic utterances classiﬁ ed as 
illocutionary metonymies following the pragmatic typology of metonymic functions are 
presented. 
Th e inferencing processes are facilitated by metonymic connections existing between 
domains or subdomains in the same functional domain. It has been widely accepted by 
cognitive linguists that universal human knowledge and embodiment are essential for 
the interpretation of metonymy. Th is analysis points to the role of cultural background 
knowledge in understanding target meanings. All these aspects of metonymic connections 
are exploited in complex inferential processes in spoken discourse. In most cases, 
metaphoric mappings  are also a part of utterance interpretation. 
Key words: cognitive linguistics; pragmatics; metonymy; discourse analysis; inferencing; 
cultural knowledge.
1. Introduction
Metonymy has been explored in both the ﬁ eld of cognitive linguistics and in 
pragmatics. A common object of inquiry of both ﬁ elds is to interpret human understanding 
and reasoning and how it is reﬂ ected in language. Pragmaticists are mostly concerned 
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with the ability of drawing inferences. In cognitive linguistics, metonymy is a conceptual 
phenomenon that plays a role in pragmatic inferencing.
Panther and Th ornburg (1998, 2003) call metonymies ‘natural inference schemas’ 
i.e. easily activatable associations among concepts that can be used for inferential 
purposes.
Barcelona (2004) claims that two or more conceptual metonymies contribute to 
the meaning structure coded in a given utterance or a piece of discourse. Moreover, all 
the relevant metonymies are based on the knowledge implied in metonymic connections 
which is shared between conversational interactants.
Th is paper presents a study of metonymy as a conceptual tool for guiding 
inferencing in the interpretation of spoken discourse. Th e standard approach to the 
cognitive linguistic theory of metonymy emphasizes the conceptual and cognitive 
nature of metonymy where universal human knowledge and embodiment are essential 
for the interpretation of metonymy. Th is analysis points to the role of cultural 
background knowledge which may have a prototypical value in understanding target 
meanings. 
Th e interpretation of the cases is based on the deﬁ nition of metonymy as a 
mapping of knowledge from a source domain onto a target domain. Source and target 
domains are in the same functional domain and they are linked by a pragmatic function 
(Barcelona, 2002). Th e source of metonymy highlights the target meaning that becomes 
salient in a given communicative situation. We agree with Panther and Th ornburg 
(2003) that source meanings remain active to some degree.
In the ﬁ rst part of the paper we give a brief survey of the literature on metonymy 
in cognitive linguistics and studies concerning the role of metonymy in pragmatic 
inferencing. Th e second part presents the analysis of 7 pieces of television discourse. We 
claim that 5 short dialogues cannot be fully interpreted without metonymies based on 
cultural background knowledge. 
We hope that our contribution will provide evidence that metonymy is not only a 
cognitive process based on universal and embodied human conceptions, but the one 
that involves the knowledge about the cultural and social environment as well.
2. Metonymy 
Metonymy has been known as a ﬁ gure of speech since the times of the ancient 
Greeks. It was mostly studied in the context of literature and rhetoric, and included a 
substitution of words (Nerlich, Clarke and Todd, 1999; Koch, 1999). Th e term metonymy 
originated from ancient Greek philosophy, more precisely from Plato’s Cratylus (Nerlich, 
Clarke and Todd, 1999, p.361). Aristotle in his Poetics distinguished four classes of 
‘metaphors’. One class among them was later termed ‘metonymy’, and another 
‘synecdoche’ (Nerlich, Clarke and Todd, 1999, p. 362). Th us, Aristotle included the 
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phenomenon that we today refer to as metonymy under the name of metaphor. Koch 
(1999) gives a historical survey of the semantic basis of metonymy and claims that 
metonymy traditionally belongs to classical rhetorics. Th e earliest deﬁ nition of 
metonymy (Lat. denominatio) as a rhetorical trope can be found in the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium (Her. IV: 32,43 = Anonymous, 1894, [1954 in ref list] p. 337). Koch’s 
translation of the deﬁ nition is as follows: “Denominatio [i.e. ‘metonymy’] is a trope that 
takes its expression from near and close things and by which we can comprehend a 
thing that is not denominated by its proper word.” (Koch, 1999, p. 141). 
For a long period of time many scholars deﬁ ned metonymy in terms of contiguity 
or associations between two words. Among the 20th century linguists we shall mention 
Roudet (1921) and Ullmann (1962) and their approach to metonymy. According to 
Roudet, metonymy is based on contiguity between ideas, or ‘conceptual’ contiguity, in 
Koch’s more up-to-date terms (1999, p. 144). Ullmann’s theory of semantic change is 
based on associations between old and new meaning (1962, p. 211). Th is view suggests 
that every word is surrounded by a network of associations which connect them with 
other words. Semantic changes can be based on associations between senses and those 
between names. Semantic changes based on an association between senses include two 
kinds of associations: similarity and contiguity. Th ey result in two types of semantic 
change: metaphor (similarity of senses) and metonymy (contiguity of senses). Th e 
following comparison of metaphor and metonymy had a strong inﬂ uence on scholars in 
the forthcoming decades: “Metonymy is instrinsically less interesting than metaphor 
since it does not discover new relations but arises between words already related to each 
other” (Ullmann, 1962, p. 218). Furthermore, Ullmann classiﬁ ed metonymies according 
to the associations they were based on: spatial relations, temporal relations, PART-
WHOLE relations, which were traditionally deﬁ ned as synecdoche, inventions named 
after the inventors, etc. Th is theory of associative ﬁ elds gave a better insight into the 
processes which could be followed but did not entirely explain them. As a result, 
metonymy became one of the topics of semantics.
However, it was only after new research and interdisciplinary approach to language 
had revealed the cognitive basis of language that metonymy found its place among 
other cognitive processes. Th e study of metonymy within cognitive linguistics has 
shown that metonymy is much more than a relationship between words. Metonymy is 
considered to be a cognitive process that plays an important role in human thoughts 
and language (Lakoﬀ  and Johnson, 1980; Lakoﬀ , 1987; Langacker, 1999). One of the 
revolutionary principles of cognitive linguistics is the view that word meaning includes 
all our knowledge, not only linguistic, but at the same time, world knowledge. It is 
termed ‘encyclopedic knowledge’ and arises from all our mental and physical experiences 
(Žic Fuchs, 1991). Th erefore, it is possible for cognitive linguistics to argue that 
communication is based on the same conceptual system that is used for thinking and 
reasoning. Since it is very diﬃ  cult to trace processes involved in thinking and reasoning, 
one way of identifying them is through the study of their linguistic realizations. Th is 
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view makes language one of the best means by which important evidence of how the 
conceptual system functions can be provided (Lakoﬀ  and Johnson, 1980, p. 3). Since 
metonymy is one of the cognitive processes that we use regularly, its study should yield 
some interesting insights.
Lakoﬀ  and Johnson (1980) were among the ﬁ rst cognitive linguists concerned 
with metaphor and metonymy. Th ey deﬁ ne metonymy as the use of one entity to stand 
for another which is related to it. In their view, metonymy has a primarily referential 
function, but it also contributes to understanding. Metonymies are not arbitrary 
phenomena, they are systematic and can be seen as metonymic concepts such as: PART 
FOR WHOLE, PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED, PLACE 
FOR INSTITUTION, etc.
Th e following sentences are linguistic realizations of the above-mentioned 
metonymic concepts:
We don’t hire longhairs.
He bought a Ford.
Nixon bombed Hanoi.
Wall Street is in panic. (Lakoﬀ  and Johnson, 1980, p. 38-39).
People have no diﬃ  culties understanding these expressions because metonymic 
conceptual patterns structure not only our language but also our thoughts and actions. 
Our knowledge and experience, both physical and mental, form the basis for 
understanding metonymic expressions. It is obvious that metonymy focuses on the 
aspect that is most important in the given situation. Th us, this aspect becomes a salient 
part of a person or context.
Moreover, Lakoﬀ  (1987) shows that metonymic models are cognitive models 
present in the way we categorize. Experiments in cognitive psychology have shown that 
people ﬁ nd some members of categories to be better examples of these categories than 
other members. Th ese representative members are called prototypes and they are often 
used metonymically to stand for the whole category. For example, a housewife-mother 
is considered a better example of the category ‘mother’ than a working mother. Th us, a 
housewife-mother is used as the stereotype which usually stands for the whole category 
‘mother’.
Radden and Kövecses (1999) adopt the view that metonymy is a cognitive process 
in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual 
entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model. In fact they adapt 
Langacker’s (1993) notion of ‘reference point’ to the notion of metonymy. Th at is, they 
regard metonymy as a reference point phenomenon. Th eir great contributions to the 
theory of metonymy are an extensive typology of conceptual metonymies and their 
identiﬁ cation of the cognitive and communicative principles guiding the choice of the 
metonymic sources for certain metonymic targets. 
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In literature on cognitive linguistics there are several other deﬁ nitions and 
typologies of metonymies, and all are well justiﬁ ed and exampliﬁ ed. One of the ﬁ rst 
deﬁ nitions of metonymy is known from the work of Lakoﬀ  and Johnson (1980). 
Additionally, Langacker (1999) explains metonymy as a reference point phenomenon. 
Th e chapter where Langacker presents metonymy as a reference point phenomenon is 
an update of his 1993 paper in Cognitive Linguistics on reference point phenomena. 
Nerlich, Clarke and Todd (1999) ﬁ nd Norrick’s typology (1981) the most complete and 
coherent, whereas Blank (1999) and Seto (1999), respectively, oﬀ er their own 
classiﬁ cation. Fauconnier (1994 [1985]) introduces an understanding of metonymy 
based on the notion of mental spaces. 
Traditional cognitive accounts of metonymy are based on the two-domain approach 
to metaphor and metonymy. Since we chose the two-domain approach to metonymy as 
the theoretical frame for our case analyses we will present the main elements of the 
theory.
Perhaps the best interpretation of the role of domains in metaphors and 
metonymies is found in Croft’s paper (2003), which was originally published in 1993. 
Croft develops his theory on the basis of Langacker’s (1987, ch. 4.1) deﬁ nitions of the 
concept and domain. 
Langacker describes the concept as a semantic structure symbolised by a word 
(Croft, 2003, p. 165). Each concept (or semantic structure) can be divided into a proﬁ le 
and a base. For example, a concept [ARC] has as its proﬁ le a ‘curved line segment’ and for 
its base ‘a circle’. Th e concept [CIRCLE] on its own turn has a base ‘shape’, and [SHAPE] is 
proﬁ led on the base of ‘space’. So, the base of a concept is the knowledge which is 
presupposed in the conceptualization of the proﬁ le. Th e base is also called the domain. 
Th e notion of domain is based on Langacker’s concept of domain as 
“… any sort of conceptualization: a perceptual experience, a concept, a conceptual 
concept, an elaborate knowledge system, etc” (Langacker, 1991, p. 3). 
Langacker describes the domain as follows:
“All linguistic units are context-dependent to some degree. A context for the 
characterization of a semantic unit is referred to as a domain. Domains are 
necessarily cognitive entities: mental experiences, representational spaces, 
concepts, or conceptual complexes” (1987, p. 147). 
Th us, a domain is “a semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one 
concept proﬁ le” (typically, many proﬁ les) (Croft, 2003, p. 166). Th is means that a 
concept can function either as a proﬁ le or as a base for another concept proﬁ le, whereas 
domains are structural units of our encyclopedic knowledge. Taylor (1989, p. 84) claims 
that a domain can be any conceptualization or knowledge conﬁ guration that is used for 
characterization of meanings. Some domains, for example space, time and things, are 
called basic domains because they do not require any other domain for their 
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characterization. All other domains are referred to as abstract domains since they 
presuppose another basic or non-basic domain. Most concepts involve several diﬀ erent 
domains. For example, the deﬁ nition of a human being comprises the domains of 
physical objects, living beings, volitional agents, emotions and others. All domains 
presupposed by a concept constitute the domain matrix (Langacker, 1987, p. 152). 
Metonymic mapping results in a domain shift within a domain matrix. Th us, metonymy 
makes primary the domain that is secondary in the literal meaning (Croft, 2003, p. 
179). Th is conceptual eﬀ ect is called domain highlighting (Cruse, 1986, p. 53). We shall 
illustrate these processes using Croft’s example (2003, p. 178):
a. Proust spent most of his time in bed.
b. Proust is tough to read.
Sentence a. is literal, and sentence b. is metonymic. However, in the encyclopedic 
view of semantics, Proust as a person and the works of Proust are both included in the 
domain matrix of the concept [PROUST]. But Proust was primarily a person and that 
knowledge is primary in the literal meaning. Proust’s work, i.e. the domain of creativity 
is secondary to the domain of Proust as a human being. Th erefore, the metonymic shift 
involves a shift of domains within the domain matrix for the concept [PROUST]. Th is 
shift leads to the highlighting of the domain that is secondary in the literal meaning. 
Th us, Proust’s work becomes a salient element in the given situation. 
Th e key issue at this point are the boundaries of domains because they are crucial 
for the distinction between domains. Th e main principle that many cognitive linguists 
support is that metaphoric mapping occurs between two domains, whereas metonymic 
mapping occurs within one conceptual domain (Lakoﬀ  and Turner, 1989, p. 103; Lakoﬀ , 
1987) or within one domain matrix (Langacker, 1987). Barcelona (2002, p. 246) 
proposes the function of a domain as a criterion for distinguishing between conceptual 
domains, stressing that in metonymic mapping the source and target domains are in 
the same functional domain. Th e author gives a broad deﬁ nition of metonymy which he 
calls the schematic deﬁ nition because it contains the necessary and suﬃ  cient conditions 
for metonymicity:
“Metonymy is a mapping of a conceptual domain, the source, onto another 
domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional domain and are 
linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated” 
(Barcelona, 2002, p. 246).
Barcelona (2003, pp.83-84) uses the term mapping as a projection of knowledge in 
the sense that the source domain is connected to the target domain by imposing a 
perspective on it. In other words, the source is not a substitution for the target but it 
merely activates the target domain from a given perspective. 
When applied to inferencing, this means that both domains contribute to the full 
contextual meaning of an utterance. We hope to demonstrate that inference patterns in 
Arijana Krišković – Sandra Tominac, Metonymy based on cultural background knowledge and... 
FLUMINENSIA, god. 21 (2009) br. 2, str. 49-72 55
spoken discourse are based on conceptual metonymies operating within cognitive 
domains.
3. Th e functions of metonymy 
Some cognitive linguists view metonymy as having primarily a referential function 
(Lakoﬀ  and Johnson, 1980), i.e. denoting a relation of substitution where one entity 
stands for another or provides mental access to another entity (Radden and Kövecses, 
1999), but it has been shown that metonymy is ubiquitous in our cognition and 
functions at all linguistic levels.  
Croft’s (2003, p. 179) interpretation of metonymic mapping refers to metonymy 
as a lexical phenomenon, but metonymy also occurs in grammatical constructions (e.g. 
Goossens, 1999; Waltereit, 1999; Brdar, 2000, 2007; Panther and Th ornburg, 1998, 
2000, 2003; Brdar et al., 2001; Barcelona, 2004a) and in discourse and inferencing 
(Barcelona 2002, 2003, 2004; Panther and Th ornburg 2003a and papers therein). 
An adequate and systematic typology of metonymic functions is proposed by 
Panther and Th ornburg (1998, 1999, p. 335) as the pragmatic typology of metonymic 
functions:
 “a. propositional metonymies: 
 (1) referential and    
 (2) predicational; 
    b. illocutionary metonymies.”
Illocutionary metonymies are non-referential metonymies 
“wherein one illocutionary act stands for another illocutionary act, as, e.g. in the 
statement or assertation
 a. I don’t know where the bath soap is
which may metonymically stand for the question or inquiry 
 b. Where is the bath soap?” (Panther and Th ornburg, 1999, p. 335).
Utterance a. is an assertion about what the speaker does not know, but indirectly 
it is used as a question, i.e. an indirect speech act. Searle (1975) claims that two 
illocutionary acts, primary and secondary, are performed in an indirect speech act. 
Panther and Th ornburg (1999, p. 335) develop his hypothesis further and ﬁ nd a 
correspondence with the phenomenon of metonymy. Th e authors explain that both 
metonymic vehicle or source (the secondary illocutionary act) and the target (the 
primary illocutionary act) are conceptually present in the speaker’s mind. Th us, they 
give an explanation of indirect speech acts as involving metonymies.
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4. Metonymy and pragmatic inferencing             
Nerlich and Clarke (2002, p. 560-561) stress the importance of understanding 
word meaning as having fuzzy boundaries and being context-sensitive. Th ey incorporate 
this view in their formulation of sentence meaning:
“Th e view that sentence meaning is the sum of the meanings of the words used 
in the sentence must be replaced by a view of sentence meaning as being the 
result of integrational and inferential processes feeding on clues other than those 
contained in the meaning of each word in isolation, that is, clues arising from 
the co-text of the sentence and the wider context of the situation of discourse” 
(Nerlich and Clarke, 2002, p. 560).
It should be added here that the context of the situation contains knowledge that 
is shared between the speakers and listeners. Gibbs (1998, p. 261-262) calls it common 
ground information, whereas Žic Fuchs uses the term knowledge of the world (Žic Fuchs, 
1991).
Panther and Th ornburg (1998) explore the inferential processes and the role of 
metonymy in drawing inferences. Th ey assume the inferential approach to utterance 
meaning is a necessary component of a theory of utterance meaning. However, this 
theoretical approach does not satisfactorily account for the fact that conversational 
participants usually draw the inferences necessary to arrive at intended interpretations 
without any noticeable eﬀ ort. Furthermore, it does not systematically specify the kinds of 
inference patterns that are needed for utterance interpretation. Panther and Th ornburg 
show that a cognitive approach incorporating the notion of action scenario structure can 
be applied to the analysis of conversation. A scenario consists of parts (the BEFORE, the 
CORE, the RESULT, the AFTER part) that can be metonymically linked to each other and 
to the whole of the scenario. Conceptual relationships such as part-whole, cause-eﬀ ect 
facilitate the inferential work of conversational interactants. Th ese general relationships 
within scenario structure thus constitute natural inference schemata, i.e. easily activatable 
associations among concepts that can be used for inferential purposes. Th us, they propose 
the scenario approach to metonymy in speech acts. 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Hernández (2003) link work on conceptual metonymy in 
cognitive linguistics to Gricean pragmatics and relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 
1995). In relevance theory metaphoric and metonymic meanings are not regarded as 
being part of what is said or explicated, but as being derived via implicature. Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Hernández propose that the principle of relevance must be supplemented 
by metaphoric and metonymic mappings, i.e. cognitive operations used for drawing 
inferences that are part of semantic and conceptual knowledge of speakers and hearers. 
Th ese cognitive operations are accomplished by means of conceptual mappings of 
knowledge from a source domain into a target domain and are crucial for the concept 
formation and concept understanding.
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Barcelona  (2003) presents a sample of jokes and anecdotes and suggests that in 
many cases the inferential work is facilitated by pre-existing metonymic connections in 
a cognitive domain or by pre-existing metaphorical connections across domains.   
Barcelona (2004) presents a case study of selected texts which conﬁ rms his 
hypothesis that  two or more conceptual metonymies, often chained to each other, are 
shown to be active at least in two (normally in more) dimensions of analysis of the same 
utterance. It is to be expected that metonymy will be operative at several analytical 
levels (from morpheme to sentence to utterance or text) of a given usage event. For 
example, in a dialogue
“How much gas did you buy?”
“I just ﬁ lled (h)er up.” 
several chained metonymies are responsible for various aspects of the full value of the 
second utterance which can be paraphrased as
“I bought the quantity of gas that ﬁ ts into a tank.”
Th e inference of the reply is guided by conceptual metonymies RESULT (ﬁ lling up 
the deposit) FOR PRECONDITION (buying a certain amount of gas), VERTICALITY 
(level of height reached in ﬁ lling) FOR QUANTITY (amount of gas), WHOLE (car) FOR 
PART (gas tank). 
We believe that all the relevant metonymies in a piece of discourse operate 
simultaneously and unconsciously for the activation of the full intended interpretation. 
Th erefore, a metonymic set may be a more appropriate term than metonymic chain for 
this situation. Given the complexity of involved aspects of meaning, a metonymic set 
has a prototypical structure where one or more metonymies are crucial for the pragmatic 
inference, and other metonymies contribute to the relevance of the utterance. Th e 
arrangement of the components in a metonymic set reﬂ ects their conceptual distance 
from the core component. Th e inference of the reply is derived from the ﬁ rst metonymy 
which is essential for understanding. Th us, metonymy that activates the target meaning 
may have a prototypical value but other metonymies also assist in the interpretation of 
the utterance. Given the complexity of involved aspects of meaning, the source domain 
remains present in the background of the target meaning due to the knowledge on 
which metonymic connections are based.
5. Metonymy in television interviews 
Th e case study includes 7 examples of metonymy in television interviews broadcast 
on CNN television on talk shows. For this purpose, interviews retrievable as transcripts 
from the Internet were used. Th e complexity of background information, i.e. common 
knowledge, implied by the participants in the interviews was noticeable. In analyzing 
background knowledge shared between the speakers and listeners, the distinction was 
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made between universal human knowledge and culture-speciﬁ c knowledge that served 
as the motivation for creating metonymic inferences. We noticed the importance of 
culture-speciﬁ c knowledge for understanding metonymies in spoken discourse and 
establishing successful communication. 
Our analytical method includes several theoretical elements:  
-  We assume that discourse meaning is represented in terms of domains as viewed by 
Langacker (1987) and Croft (2003). 
-  Data analysis was performed on the basis of the schematic deﬁ nitions of metonymy 
and metaphor proposed by Barcelona (2002).
-  Th e interpretative domains used are known from the cognitive linguistic literature, 
while subdomains mostly arise from the interpretation of the discourse.
-  Th e structure of the analysis is largely based on the interpretations in Barcelona 
(2003).
-  In their model of metaphor, Zinken, Hellsten and Nerlich (2003) mention the 
interaction between universal, bodily-grounded knowledge and culture-speciﬁ c 
knowledge in discourse. We believe that this particular interaction is also crucial for 
understanding metonymy in spoken discourse. Since the role of universal knowledge 
and bodily-grounded knowledge has already been widely acknowledged, the basic aim 
of this contribution is to focus the analysis on the part culture-speciﬁ c knowledge 
plays in inferences based on metonymic processes in spoken interaction.
5.1 Metonymies based on universal background knowledge 
Th e ﬁ rst case is a short dialogue between Larry King and Mr Mandela. Larry King 
is an American television and radio host recognized in the United States as one of the 
premier broadcast interviewers. Since 1985, he has been hosting the nightly TV program 
Larry King Live on CNN where he has conducted interviews with politicians, athletes, 
entertainers and other newsmakers  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_king).
One of his guests was Nelson Mandela, a former President of South Africa who 
held oﬃ  ce from 1994–99. Before his presidency, Mandela was an anti-apartheid activist 
and served 27 years in prison. Mandela is currently a celebrated statesman who 
continues to voice his opinion on topical issues. He has received more than 250 awards 
over four decades, most notably the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Nelson_Mandela).
Th e interpretation of the dialogue requires inferencing which is guided by 
metonymy based on universal background knowledge. Th at is, our knowledge and 
experience, both physical and mental in nature, form the basis for understanding 
metonymic expressions. People have no diﬃ  culties understanding them because 
Arijana Krišković – Sandra Tominac, Metonymy based on cultural background knowledge and... 
FLUMINENSIA, god. 21 (2009) br. 2, str. 49-72 59
metonymic conceptual patterns structure not only our language but also our thoughts 
and actions. 
(1) KING: When you look back, we only have a minute or so left.
 MANDELA: Yes, go ahead. 
(Interview with Nelson Mandela [on-line]. Available from:    
 http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0005/16/lkl.00.html)
Inference meant and conveyed by Larry King:
1. Th is is a question about memories, but a short answer is expected due to 
 limited time left for the interview.
Inference meant and conveyed by Mr Mandela:
2. I understand the situation and I will conform myself to it.
Larry King, the host of the show, is indirectly limiting time when asking his guest 
to be brief, which is conﬁ rmed by Mr Mandela’s response. Th e ﬁ rst part of the utterance 
When you look back ... is the beginning of an implicit question referring to some events 
in the past, and Mr King knows that recalling memories can take some time. So, he 
continues by politely mentioning the time left for the interview. By mentioning scarcity 
of time, Mr King signals that he wants a short answer and Mr Mandela shows that he 
understands what is expected of him. Th erefore, his immediate answer is Yes, go ahead. 
Inference 1 arises in the ACTION domain. It is based on the universal human 
knowledge that actions need time to develop. Th e mention of a limited time period 
maps metonymically onto a polite request for brevity and then both map onto the 
expectation of a short answer. 
Actions are formed of preconditons, results and the after part. Actions and time 
are closely related in our conceptual structures since actions are performed in time. So, 
a precondition for an action to take place is the availability of time, or in some situations, 
the amount of time determines the duration of action. Domain mapping occurs between 
a conceptual domain of TIME as a source domain and a target domain of a PERFORMED 
ACTION in the common functional domain of ACTION as a PART FOR WHOLE 
relationship. 
Barcelona (2004) claims that two or more conceptual metonymies contribute to 
the meaning structure coded in a given utterance or a piece of discourse. We think that 
they form a metonymic set because all relevant metonymies are based on the knowledge 
implied in metonymic connections and shared between conversational interactants. A 
metonymic set in dialogue (1) involves at least three conceptual metonymies. Th e ﬁ rst 
conceptual metonymy is PRECONDITION (TIME AVAILABLE) FOR ACTION TO BE 
PERFORMED WITHIN THAT TIME SPAN. Th e motivation for this metonymy is linked 
to the common knowledge that in a limited period of time only a limited amount of 
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activity can be accomplished. Th e second metonymy is A LIMITED TIME PERIOD FOR 
A POLITE REQUEST FOR BREVITY which operates in the LINGUSTIC domain as a 
PART FOR PART relationship. Larry King is aware that his guest will interpret correctly 
his mentioning of time as a polite request. In pragmatic terms this is an indirect speech 
act A POLITE REQUEST FOR A COMPLETE DIRECT QUESTION. Mr King’s utterance 
can be paraphrased as Can you give a short answer because we have only a little time left? 
Th is is conﬁ rmed by Mr Mandela’s reply because he gives an explicit aﬃ  rmative answer 
to the complete direct question Yes, go ahead. Another metonymy active in Mr King’s 
utterance is A UNIT OF TIME (A MINUTE) FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME 
(SHORTAGE OF TIME). Th is metonymy is triggered by the words a minute or so. Th e 
choice of the source domain is governed by the principle BASIC OVER NON-BASIC 
according to Radden and Kövecses (1999, p. 49).
Inference 2 meant by Mr Mandela is motivated by metonymy PRECONDITION 
(UNDERSTANDING THE REQUEST) FOR RESULT (UNDERSTANDING THE TASK) in 
the domain of COGNITIVE ABILITIES.  Th is metonymy acts as a precondition for 
performing the action properly. In the ACTION domain a further mapping takes place: 
A PRECONDITION (UNDERSTANDING THE TASK) FOR PERFORMING THE ACTION 
(GIVING A SHORT ANSWER).  In this situation we can say that the COGNITIVE 
ABILITIES domain is an integral part of the ACTION domain at the functional level. 
Th us, the mappings occur within the same functional domain (ACTION domain) in this 
contextual situation.
So, the TIME domain, ACTION domain, COGNITIVE ABILITIES domain and 
LINGUISTIC domain are active in inferencing in this short piece of dialogue. Th e list of 
metonymies in this example is probably not ﬁ nal, but we suppose that the mappings 
within the mentioned domains (and other possible ones) do not occur successively, 
forming a chain, but they are active all at the same time in the conceptual world. 
Another domain included here is TELEVISION INTERVIEW FORM, which represents 
the contextual setting of the dialogue and imposes its rules concerning the roles of the 
host and the guest, the topic, duration of the program, turn taking, politeness and 
possibly some other. Th ese elements make up culture speciﬁ c knowledge which is 
present in the background of all examples of short dialogues in this paper. So, it can be 
a moot point whether it is possible to make a strict distinction between universal and 
culture-speciﬁ c metonymies since cultural information is present in all dialogues. Our 
aim is not to deny the combination, but to analyse diﬀ erent metonymic motivations in 
the same context.  
Th e following is another example from the same interview that includes metonymy 
motivated by the universal human knowledge that our cognitive abilities may be 
inﬂ uenced by diﬀ erent aspects of information to be processed. 
(2) KING: You have how many children?
 MANDELA: Well, I can’t remember now.  (LAUGHTER) 
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(Interview with Nelson Mandela [on-line]. Available from:
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0005/16/lkl.00.html)
Inferences meant by Mr Mandela:
1. Mr Mandela has unusually many children.
2. He does not want to mention the exact number of his children in public.   
A part of the universal human knowledge is the notion that people have a limited 
number of children and that they take care of them. So, we suppose that Mr Mandela 
knows the number of his children, but by saying that he cannot remember how many, 
he implies that he has a lot of them. His answer can also serve as a polite refusal to 
mention the exact number.
Conceptual metonymy underlying Mandela’s answer is INABILITY TO REMEMBER 
(SALIENT PROPERTY) FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF OBJECTS (QUANTITIVE 
CATEGORY). But, the full interpretation of the utterance includes the interaction of 
metonymy and metaphor. Mandela’s answer would be interpreted as a metonymy 
INABILITY TO REMEMBER FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF OBJECTS if the situation 
stated in the source domain of COGNITIVE INABILITY were real. But, it seems that 
INABILITY TO REMEMBER (MENTAL PROPERTY) metonymically maps onto another 
mental activity POLITE AVOIDANCE OF ANSWER (MENTAL PROPERTY), where both 
mental properties are parts of the COGNITIVE domain. Th is metonymy is motivated by 
the underlying metaphorical mapping between the COGNITIVE domain and the 
EMOTION domain. AVOIDANCE OF ANSWER (COGNITIVE domain) is triggered by 
the feeling of EMBARRASSMENT (EMOTION domain) arising due to a request to 
mention in public a relatively large number of children compared to stereotypical 
expectations. Th e EMOTION domain is activated and maps onto the COGNITIVE 
domain. Th e metaphorical mapping is indicated by laughter at the communicative level. 
Th e activation of the BEHAVIOUR domain by SPECIFIC BEHAVIOUR (LAUGHTER) is 
mapped onto the COGNITIVE domain (AVOIDANCE OF ANSWER).
5.2 Metonymies based on culture-speciﬁ c background knowledge
Th e study of following 5 cases below illustrates the importance of culture-speciﬁ c 
knowledge in understanding metonymies in spoken discourse. Th e viewers or readers of 
the interview who lack some aspects of the social and cultural background knowledge 
may not be able to draw correct inferences and may feel confused.
Example (3) is relatively easy to understand due to the notorious terrorist attacks 
on the United States on September 11, 2001. On that morning, 19 al-Qaeda terrorists 
hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners. Th e hijackers intentionally crashed two 
of the airliners into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing 
everyone on board and many others working in the buildings. Both buildings collapsed 
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within two hours, destroying nearby buildings and damaging others. Th e hijackers 
crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside 
Washington, D.C. Th e fourth plane crashed into a ﬁ eld near Shanksville in rural 
Pennsylvania, after some of its passengers and ﬂ ight crew attempted to retake control 
of the plane, which the hijackers had redirected toward Washington, D.C. Th ere were no 
survivors from any of the ﬂ ights. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11).
(3) KING: Why didn’t we talk about terror, we need 9/11. I mean, you have to
 have a 9/11 to create -- we’re an after-the-fact society, aren’t we?     
 (Interview with Jon Stewart [on-line]. Available from:       
  http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0412/08/lkl.01.html )
Inference meant by Mr King
Th e terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 deeply changed the American 
society. 
Th is example may be explained by considering that the terrorist attack on the 
WTC on September 11, 2001 constitutes a subdomain of the more general domain of 
TERRORISM. Th e TERRORIST ATTACK ON SEPTEMBER 11 itself is an ACTION 
domain that includes several subdomains which form its BEFORE part, CENTRAL part 
and the AFTER part.
Th e abbreviation 9/11 is a referential metonymy that stands for the DATE 
(SEPTEMBER 11, 2001). We can say that it is a symbol of that day, because the year is 
not mentioned. However, a far more complex metonymic set is activated by the source 
domain of the DATE. Th e date is an element in the action domain of A TERRORIST 
ATTACK. Th e source domain of TIME, speciﬁ ed by a DATE, maps onto the target 
domain of ACTION (TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE WTC IN NEW YORK) that occurred 
on that day. Th e mapping is based on a PART-WHOLE relationship. 
Th e ﬁ rst metonymy is ABBREVIATION (9/11) FOR A DATE (SEPT. 11, 2001) in 
the REDUCTION domain. But, the date is an element of the central part of a terrorist 
attack that belongs to the ACTION domain. So, the second metonymy is DATE (SEPT.11, 
2001) FOR ACTION (TERRORIST ATTACK THAT OCCURRED ON THAT DAY), which 
is based on the metonymy PART OF THE ACTION FOR THE WHOLE ACTION in the 
superimposed domain of TERRORISM. 
However, the destruction of the WTC itself as the central part of an action 
(terrorist attack) resulted in many other changes aﬀ ecting all aspects of American 
lifestyle. Domains of DEATH, SHOCK, CRISIS, SENSE OF INSECURITY, THREAT and 
possibly some others are integral parts of the TERRORIST ATTACK domain. Th ey form 
the after part (result) of the whole action. Th ey are linked by a conceptual metonymy 
ACTION FOR ITS RESULT which is motivated by the relationship CAUSE (TERRORIST 
ATTACK) FOR EFFECT (THE CREATION OF A NEW SOCIETY). Th e 9/11 caused 
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changes in the American society and politics. It was a turning point that created an 
after-the-fact society. 
So, metonymic mapping occurred from A PART OF THE ACTION (DATE) FOR 
THE WHOLE ACTION (TERRORIST ATTACK) onto ANOTHER PART OF THE ACTION 
(RESULT). Th is metonymic process does not tend to develop in time as a succession 
when one metonymy is a reference point for another metonymy in Langacker’s sense or 
it provides a mental access to another metonymy (Radden and Kövecses, 1999), so that 
they form a metonymic chain. In the conceptual world such metonymic mappings are 
all active at the same time and contribute to the ﬁ nal interpretation. Th is means that 
the conceptual content of each (sub)domain related to another sub(domain) by a speciﬁ c 
metonymic connection is present in the full meaning of an utterance. Th erefore, the 
metonymies occurring in the SEPTEMBER 11 domain can be called a metonymic chain, 
but it may be more appropriate to regard them as forming a metonymic set.
Th e following short dialogue was part of the interview Larry King conducted with 
Anthony Quinn, a Mexican-American actor. Speciﬁ c cultural knowledge about Los 
Angeles is necessary for the interpretation of example (4), particularly Mr King’s 
question. 
(4) ANTHONY Q: I lived the ﬁ rst 50 years of my life here, and I didn’t ﬁ nd it 
 here. I grew up on the east side of Los Angeles.
 KING: Very poor kid? 
 (Interview with Anthony Quinn [on-line]. Available from:
 http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0004/18/lkl.00.html)
Inference meant by Mr Quinn:
1. I am wealthy now, but I was poor as a child since I grew up in a poor area of 
 L.A. 
Inference meant and conveyed by Mr King
2. Stereotypically, east side of Los Angeles is an area inhabited by poor residents.
Mr King’s question may seem inappropriate, even insulting, for those who do not 
know some cultural facts about Los Angeles. Th e east side of Los Angeles can have 
diﬀ erent meanings depending on the context and usage. Apart from denoting a 
geographical region, it is used as a cultural term referring to predominantly Latino 
communities lying east of the City of Los Angeles. Th e Westside is, in contrast, generally 
stereotyped as the ‘white part’ of the City of Los Angeles. ‘Westside’ can be also a 
shorthand term to describe the concentration of wealth in this area. Based on his 
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cultural knowledge about residents of diﬀ erent parts of Los Angeles, Mr King inferred 
that Mr Quinn must have been a poor kid. Both participants share that knowledge and 
communication is successful. If Mr King’s question had been Very rich kid?, it might have 
caused a misunderstanding. Th is conclusion is in accordance with Barcelona’s view 
(2003) that metonymies (and metaphors) also constrain the range of possible inferences 
to be drawn from the explicit proposition. Th e point has already been made by Ruiz de 
Mendoza (1997) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez Hernández (2003). 
Inference 1 arises based on the metonymy PLACE FOR ITS SALIENT PROPERTY. 
Th is metonymy operates within the PLACE domain. One subdomain integrated in the 
PLACE domain is its geographical name (the east side of Los Angeles). Another 
subdomain is a social characteristic of the speciﬁ c area. In example (4), this subdomain 
is POVERTY. So, Mr Quinn’s inference is due to the mapping of the source, the 
GEOGRAPHICAL NAME domain onto the POVERTY domain which is its salient domain 
in this communicative situation. 
Inference 2 meant and conveyed by Mr King by uttering the question Very poor 
kid? is the result of the same metonymy PLACE FOR ITS SALIENT PROPERTY because 
Mr Quinn’s statement about growing up in the East L.A. operates as a source domain 
(EAST L.A.) and invokes the POVERTY domain in Mr King’s mind. Th e utterance Very 
poor kid? in this context is understood as relevant because the POVERTY domain as 
culture speciﬁ c knowledge in the EAST L.A. domain is present in the mind of both 
communicative interactants. Th is means that interview participants (and their 
audience) share common background knowledge activated by Mr Quinn’s utterance. 
In the following dialogue (example 5) Larry King talks to Jon Stewart about 
promoting his new book. Jon Stewart is an American comedian, satirist, actor, author 
and producer. Stewart started oﬀ  as a stand-up comedian, then moved on to television, 
and hosted his own show on MTV. He also won eight Emmy Awards and is the co-author 
of the book America (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_Stewart). J.D. Salinger 
(mentioned in the following extract) is an American writer best known for his novel Th e 
Catcher in the Rye, written in 1951 but also for his reclusive nature.
(5) KING: Are you now an author?
 STEWART: Yes, and as such, I am now going to be reclusive. I’m not even 
 here. Th is is just an animatronic remote situation. I’m going to become the 
 Salinger of basic cable. Very diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd me. 
 (Interview with Jon Stewart [on-line]. Available from:         
  http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0412/08/lkl.01.html)
Inferences meant by Mr Stewart:
Salinger is a famous author known for his reclusive behaviour. 
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Mr Stewart has become an author and his behaviour will change accordingly, i.e. 
he will no longer appear on tv.
Mr Stewart is not primarily a writer, but he will adopt the behaviour of famous 
authors hoping to be regarded as completely belonging to this profession.
Salinger is an author who stands for a speciﬁ c behaviour. It is stereotypically thought 
that the majority of writers are reclusive. Salinger is also known for his reclusive nature. 
He has not given an interview since 1974 and has not made a public appearance nor 
published any new work since 1965. Th erefore, Salinger’s behaviour is a typical example of 
a reclusive character. Jon Stewart became popular as a political satirist, actor, television 
host and writer. Basic cable is the network where Stewart hosts his show. Th ese pieces of 
information form the cultural background knowledge required for making the inferences. 
Inference 1 emerges from the metonymy AUTHOR (SALINGER) FOR 
CHARACTERISTIC BEHAVIOUR (RECLUSIVE BEHAVIOUR) based on the conceptual 
metonymy PEOPLE FOR CHARACTERISTIC BEHAVIOUR. Th is metonymy operates in 
the domain of WRITERS. Apart from the above mentioned metonymy, another 
metonymy is activated and it explains the use of SALINGER as a “paragon” of the 
category of writers that are extremely reclusive: SALIENT MEMBER (SALINGER) FOR 
CATEGORY (EXTREMELY RECLUSIVE WRITERS) (see Lakoﬀ , 1987 on metonymic 
models; Barcelona, 2004a, Brdar, 2007 on paragon names). 
Inference 2 is guided by a metaphorical mapping across two functional domains 
(Barcelona 2002). Th e domain of WRITERS is metaphorically mapped onto the domain 
of BASIC CABLE SHOWMEN. More speciﬁ cally, a sub-domain CHARACTERISTIC 
BEHAVIOUR from the WRITERS domain projects onto the domain of BASIC CABLE 
SHOWMEN, conveying the idea that Stewart will not be available in that medium for a 
long time. 
Inference 3 is possibly meant by Mr Stewart. In the WRITERS domain, a subdomain 
CHARACTERISTIC BEHAVIOUR may be metonymically linked to a subdomain of 
RECOGNITION /FAME (FAMOUS WRITERS), such as in Salinger’s case. Th e subdomain 
of CHARACTERISTIC BEHAVIOUR in the domain of BASIC CABLE SHOWMEN, 
metaphorically enriched with the content from the WRITERS domain (RECLUSIVE 
BEHAVIOUR), further maps onto the subdomain of RECOGNITION/FAME in the 
WRITERS domain. But, the reclusive character is not stereotypically linked to showmen. 
It is not enough to adopt the behaviour of famous writers to become one of them. Such 
discrepancies result in irony. Jon Stewart is not primarily an author, but a showman 
and comedian. By comparing his behaviour with a famous author such as Salinger, 
Stewart self-ironically implies that his new role, as an author, will demand of him some 
behaviour modiﬁ cation. 
Th e inferences in the above short dialogue are motivated by the interaction of 
metonymic and metaphorical mappings. Interactants in the interview and their listeners 
might also have drawn other, additional inferences.
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In the following dialogue Conan O’Brien, an American talk show host and 
comedian, and Bob Costas, a sportscaster for NBC, make satirical comments on the size 
of movie-star heads. Costas uses a geographic name/location, Mount Rushmore, to refer 
metonymically to the characteristics of an American national memorial on Mount 
Rushmore. Mount Rushmore (in South Dakota, US) is a monumental granite sculpture of 
the heads of four US Presidents (Washington, Jeﬀ erson, Roosevelt and Lincoln). An 
outstanding characteristic of the sculpture is the size of carved faces. 
(6) COSTAS: Most movie stars and television stars have outsized heads.
 O’BRIEN: Right. Most of them can’t stand without some kind of support. It’s 
 true. Th ese movie stars have giant heads, tiny little bodies. And I was blessed 
 with a big head. As a child, I was mocked. But once I got into television, this 
 thing -- people watching it right now, if you’re at an airport, if you’re in a 
 prison, wherever you are, you know, this is scary. And on TV, it works. It just 
 pops.
 COSTAS: Th e biggest stars, their heads could go on Mount Rushmore, actual size.
 O’BRIEN: Th at’s true. Some of them huge, giant, massive bulbous heads.
 (Interview with Conan O’Brien [on-line]. Available from:       
 http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/16/lkl.01.html)
Inferences meant and conveyed by Mr Costas:
1. Th e biggest stars have outsized heads compared to their bodies.
2. Having a big head is a feature of a TV celebrity.
3. A big head does not necessarily mean an important person.
Th e appearances of the carved faces on Mount Rushmore in the media and popular 
culture often include a replacement of one or more of the four presidents’ faces with 
other people or characters. Moreover, because the mountain is an important historical 
landmark, it is often used as a base for various action movies and books. Mr Costas uses 
Mount Rushmore as a hyperbole for both physical size of the heads of the biggest stars 
compared to their bodies, and for their importance as celebrities. 
Inference 1 arises on metonymy MOUNT RUSHMORE (PLACE) FOR A SCULPTURE 
(A PIECE OF ART CARVED THERE) FOR OUTSIZED HEADS (A SALIENT PROPERTY OF 
THE SCULPTURE).  Conceptual metonymy underlying this interpretation is A PLACE 
FOR ITS SALIENT PROPERTY (SIZE),  which is based on a WHOLE-FOR-PART relation-
ship. 
Inference 2 results from the interaction of metonymy and metaphor. Metonymical 
mapping takes place between MOUNT RUSHMORE (PLACE) FOR A SCULPTURE (A 
PIECE OF ART CARVED THERE) FOR THE OUTSIZED HEADS OF US PRESIDENTS (A 
SALIENT PROPERTY OF THE SCULPTURE). Conceptual metonymy activated is PLACE 
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FOR ITS SALIENT PROPERTY (REPRESENTED PERSONS). Metaphor results from the 
activation of the TELEVISION MEDIUM domain (TV STARS) which is mapped onto the 
domain of AMERICAN PRESIDENTS (CARVED HEADS OF FOUR US PRESIDENTS). 
Both domains include a subdomain of FAME/RECOGNITION. Discrepancy occurs in 
the FAME/RECOGNITION domain because TV stars cannot be considered as important 
as American presidents. Th erefore, inference 3 is meant but not conveyed. Metaphorical 
interpretation is based on the conceptual metaphor IMPORTANT IS BIG. 
Let us consider another example of metonymy that reveals a complex structure of 
background knowledge in the interpretation.   
(7) KING: Are you an optimist?
 STEWART: Sorry? I’m a Jew. What kind of question is that, are you an 
 optimist? I always have my bags packed. Is that optimistic. I never know 
 when they’re going to knock on my door and go (SPEAKING IN FOREIGN 
 LANGUAGE).
 (Interview with Jon Stewart [on-line]. Available from:          
                http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0412/08/lkl.01.html)
Inferences meant and conveyed by Mr Stewart: 
1. Mr Stewart’s ﬁ rst reaction to a simple question about his optimism is a 
 surprise (Sorry?). 
2. Mr Stewart is a Jew, and Jews are (according to him) pessimists.
3. It seems inappropriate to ask Mr Stewart about his optimism since he is a 
 Jew. 
At ﬁ rst sight there is no relevant link between his optimism, or lack of optimism, 
and being a Jew. However, Stewart explains his attitude alluding to the dark pages of 
Jews’ history, namely to the Holocaust and the genocide of Jews when the Nazis used 
to break into Jewish houses and transported the whole families to extermination 
camps. So, being a Jew for him means being pessimistic, which is a trait inherited from 
the suﬀ erings of his nation. 
Inference 1 is based on the metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING which is 
activated by the EMOTION domain (SURPRISE). Mr Stewart was surprised to hear Mr 
King’s question and he couldn’t understand the relevance of the question he heard. 
Inference 2 occurs in the NATION domain. Th e source domain JEWS 
(NATIONALITY) is mapped onto the target domain PESSIMISM (A CHARACTERISTIC 
TRAIT). Th e conceptual metonymy active in this situation is NATIONALITY FOR ITS 
SALIENT PROPERTY. Atrocities experienced by the Jewish nation resulted in pessimism 
as a personality trait of the people. So, the events from the Jewish history that are part 
of the JEWS domain are metonymically linked to the subdomain of PESSIMISM by a 
CAUSE-FOR-EFFECT relationship. 
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6. Conclusion
Metonymy is a common cognitive process that reﬂ ects one of the many ways in 
which human beings categorize knowledge and communicate. Metonymic principles 
provide an explanatory tool for understanding inferences. In cases presented in this 
paper, metonymy motivates pragmatic inferencing in short pieces of spoken discourse. 
Metonymic mapping from the source onto the target domain or subdomain 
involves an interaction between universal, bodily-grounded and culture-speciﬁ c 
knowledge. Since the role of universal and bodily-grounded knowledge in metonymy 
(and metaphor) has already received due attention, this study concentrates on the cases 
that include metonymies based on speciﬁ c cultural knowledge. Th e participants in the 
interviews share the same cultural knowledge and for this reason communication is 
successful. However, an interactant or an observer who does not possess the necessary 
background knowledge included in the metonymic mappings cannot draw appropriate 
inferences automatically and successfully and communication may become confusing. 
Th erefore, we wanted to stress that cultural knowledge is as crucial for the metonymic 
processes in spoken discourse as universal and embodied knowledge and should be 
given equal importance.
In the metonymic mapping, the source domain activates the target domain, but 
the conceptual content of the source domain remains present and contributes to the 
full interpretation of an utterance. Metonymic processes in examples given in this paper 
usually include two or more metonymies occurring in the same domain. Th us, we believe 
that metonymic mappings occur simultaneously and automatically. Th ey are not 
successive, but integrated in the conceptual world. Th e result is a combination of 
inferences leading to the full contextual meaning of the dialogue. Such situation can be 
called a metonymic chain, but it may be more appropriate to regard concurrent 
metonymies as forming a metonymic set.
Th is study focuses on metonymy, but the analysis of several pieces of spoken 
discourse reveals that an interaction of metonymy and metaphor is also operative in the 
processes of pragmatic inferencing. We can say that metonymy and metaphor-based 
inferencing plays an essential role in utterance interpretation, although some other 
mechanisms, which are not dealt with in this paper, are probably involved as well. 
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SAŽETAK
Arijana Krišković – Sandra Tominac
METONIMIJA TEMELJENA NA KULTUROLOŠKOM ZNANJU I 
PRAGMATIČKA INFERENCIJA U GOVORNOM DISKURSU
Poimanje metonimije kao konceptualnog alata za inferenciju u jeziku otvorilo je novo područje 
proučavanja u kognitivnoj lingvistici i pragmalingvistici. Kako bi se shvatila vrijednost metonimije 
pri pragmatičkoj inferenciji, funkciju metonimije treba sagledati šire od njene prototipne 
referencijalne funkcije. Metonimijska preslikavanja odvijaju se u govornim činovima na razini 
referencije, predikacije, rečenice i ilokucije.
Ovaj rad bavi se ulogom metonimije u pragmatičkoj inferenciji u govornom diskursu na 
primjerima uzetima iz televizijskih intervjua. Analizirani su autentični izričaji koji se klasiﬁ ciraju 
kao ilokucijske metonimije prema pragmatičkoj tipologiji metonimijskih funkcija.
Metonimijske veze koje postoje između domena i poddomena u istoj funkcionalnoj domeni 
olakšavaju procese inferencije. U kognitivnoj lingvistici opće je prihvaćeno da su univerzalno 
ljudsko znanje i tjelesna iskustva bitna za interpretaciju metonimije. Ova analiza ukazuje na 
ulogu speciﬁ čnog kulturološkog znanja u razumijevanju ciljanih značenja. Svi navedeni aspekti 
metonimijskih veza iskorišteni su u složenim inferencijskim procesima u govornom diskursu. U 
mnogim slučajevima, metaforička preslikavanja također se javljaju kao dio interpretacije izričaja. 
Ključne riječi: kognitivna lingvistika; pragmalingvistika; metonimija; analiza 
diskursa; inferencija; kulturološko znanje.
